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THE WIRETAP ACT-RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: A FRAME
WORK FOR DETERMINING THE "INTERCEPTION" OF ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS FOLLOWING United States v. Councilman's Re
jection of the StoragelTransit Dichotomy
INTRODUCTION
Electronic communications such as e-maiF have ushered in a
communications revolution. 2 The Electronic Communications Pri
vacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA")3 attempted to extend the protections of
the existing Wiretap Act 4 to the modern, digital forms of communi
cation. s Yet, it has not always been clear when the ECPA's wiretap
provisions apply and when they do not.
Imagine that two people are interested in covertly intercepting
all of your e-mail communications. The first one, Bob, goes to great
expense and difficulty to develop a method of "overhearing" your
incoming and outgoing messages while they are actually traveling
1. Throughout this Note, He-mail" is used as a proxy for all forms of electronic
communications. See Supplemental Brief for the United States at 12, United States v.
Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1383), 2004 WL 3201458 (describing e
mail as the "paradigmatic example of electronic communications" under the Wiretap
Act). It is the type of electronic communication at issue in many of the cases examined.
Moreover, the technical details of howe-mail is transmitted are similar to those of other
forms of digital electronic communications.
2. Indeed, billions of e-mail messages are transmitted by American businesses
every day. Max Guirguis, Electronic Mail Surveillance and the Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy, 8 J. TECH. L. & POL'y 135, 142 (2003). E-mail has, in fact, become "indis
pensable" to the business world. [d.
3. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711, 3121-3127
(2000».
4. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit.
III, 82 Stat. 197, 197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000».
The term "wiretap" dates to more than a century ago and originally referred to con
necting to a telegraph or telephone wire in order to monitor communications traveling
along the wire. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1473 (11th ed.
2003). In current usage, though, the term is no longer restricted to the interception of
communications traveling by wire, nor even to telephone and telegraph communica
tions. WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 151 (1998).
5. In particular, the Wiretap Act requires a court order based on a strong, partic
ularized showing of probable cause to believe that the targeted individual has commit
ted or will commit an offense enumerated by the statute, and that wiretap surveillance
is likely to yield evidence of such offense. In addition, the Wiretap Act requires close
judicial oversight of the entire process. See infra Part I.D.
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along a wire between computers. It is an exceedingly difficult pro
cess, and it takes very expensive equipment to achieve his goal.
The second, Alice, has a cheaper solution. She uses off-the-shelf
software to alter the mail-delivery software that routes messages to
and from your e-mail mailbox. The software waits until the e-mail
is no longer traveling along a wire, but is instead in temporary com
puter storage on the routing computer. The software retrieves your
messages from temporary storage, sends a duplicate to a separate e
mail address where Alice can then read all of your e-mail at her
leisure, and sends the original message on to its destination. Her
method is cheap, efficient, easy, and nearly impossible to detect (at
least by you).
Which spy are you more worried about? Is it Bob, who must
expend great effort and enormous sums of money to monitor the
wire your e-mail travels over? Or is it Alice, whose off-the-shelf
software can achieve the same end, quickly and at low cost, by mon
itoring the computer storage that your messages are temporarily
held in before delivery? Under current wiretap law, Bob's mode of
surveillance is unquestionably prohibited, while Alice's low-budget,
relatively simple surveillance scheme mayor may not be prohibited,
depending on the court's interpretation of the meaning of
"intercept. "
This was the issue presented in United States v. Councilman, a
recent case in the First Circuit, which held that even Alice's brand
of surveillance is prohibited by federal wiretap law. 6 The issue,
however, is far from settled. Decisions in several other circuits
have found that any retrieval from electronic storage, regardless of
how temporary and incidental to transmission the storage is, is by
definition not an intercept (and therefore not prohibited) under
federal wiretap law.7 This Note reviews the development of the
"storage test," the First Circuit's rejection of such a test in Council
man, and the shortcomings of both approaches. It then proposes an
alternative approach and provides an analytical framework for fu
ture courts to use in resolving the question whether a given acquisi
tion constitutes an "intercept" within the meaning of the law.
Part I of this Note examines the evolution of wiretap law in
America. Part II analyzes how the courts have determined whether
and when a given type of electronic communication is intercepted
within the meaning of the statute. Prior to 2005, every circuit to
6.
7.

418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005); see infra Part III.
See infra Part I1.B.
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have addressed the issue had either adopted or spoken favorably of
the storage/transit dichotomy that was first developed in the Fifth
Circuit. Part III examines in detail the First Circuit's 2005 Council
man decision, which rejected the storage/transit test used by other
circuits. Part IV establishes that the storage/transit test must be re
jected, notes that Councilman provides no definite alternative, and
offers such an alternative approach, along with a proposed frame
work for courts to use in determining whether and when a given
electronic communication has been intercepted within the meaning
of the statute.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

Brief History of the Right to Privacy in America

Privacy has been described in many ways. To some, it is one's
"interest in not having his affairs known to others."8 Another the
ory focuses on the "claim of individuals, groups or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent informa
tion about them is communicated to others."9 Perhaps most memo
rably, the right to privacy has been characterized simply as "the
right to be let alone. "10
The intellectual origins of a right to privacy lie in the notion
that there is a boundary between the public and private parts of our
lives, recognized since the time of the ancient Greeks. l l It is the
separation of these realms that establishes the distinction between
those things that should be shown to others and those things that
should remain hidden. 12 Even the most ancient of written systems
of law, the Hammurabi Code, recognized that certain rights with an
aspect of privacy to them were of great importance, to the point of
providing the death penalty for the crime of breaking into another
man's home. 13 However rooted in the mists of human philosophy
and history the right of individual privacy may be, in the modern
8. RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 73 (West 1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (1939)).
9. Id. (quoting ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967)).
10. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193 (1890). The phrase was repeated by Justice Brandeis in his famous dis
sent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The coinage of the phrase has been attributed to Judge Thomas Cooley, in about 1880.
TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 8, at 23.
11. TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 8, at 2-3.
12. Id. at 10 (quoting an excerpt from HANNA ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION
38-78 (1958)).
13. Id. at 7 n.2 (quoting Article 2 of the Code of Hammurabi, which provided: "If
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era, the scope of that right is defined by statutory and judge-made
law.
A right to privacy was not explicitly recognized in American
law until the late nineteenth century, though such a right in various
forms was implicitly protected under constitutional principles and
common law tort theory.14 The "right to be let alone" was first
identified by Judge Thomas Cooley in the 1880s. 15 In 1890, Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis used the phrase again in laying out the
natural-law foundation of privacy rights and advocating for the ex
plicit recognition of a legally-protected right to privacy.16 The first
explicit judicial recognition of the right to privacy occurred only fif
teen years laterP The campaign for explicit recognition then lan
guished for decades.
By 1960, Dean William Prosser had identified four main types
of tort-based rights to privacy from the case law. 18 The first of
these, later incorporated into the Second Restatement of Torts,19
involved the "intrusion upon [one's] seclusion or solitude, or into
his private affairs. "20 It is this sort of violation of privacy that is the
concern of wiretap law. 21
a man makes a breach into a house, one shall kill him in front of the breach, and bury
him in it").
14. Id. at 22 (discussing the First Amendment's rights to free speech, press, and
association; the Third Amendment's protection against the quartering of soldiers in
one's home; the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures; the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination; and the common law
tort protections from nuisance, trespass, and private eavesdropping).
15. /d. at 23.
16. Id.; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 193. The Warren and Bran
deis article is regarded as one of the most influential pieces of legal scholarship in the
history of American law. TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 8, at 38.
17. TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 8, at 23 (citing Pavesich v. New Eng. Life
Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905), which recognized a legal right of privacy and held that
the publication of a person's picture without his or her consent violated that right).
18. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383,389 (1960) (describing the
four torts as: 1) intrusions on one's seclusion or solitude, or into one's private affairs; 2)
public disclosure of embarrassing facts; 3) publicity placing one in a false light; and 4)
appropriation of one's name or likeness). Dean Prosser noted that at the time only four
states had case law rejecting the right of privacy. [d. at 388.
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). The Restatement
notes that even if the defendant makes no use of the information obtained, the intru
sion alone subjects him to liability. § 652B cmt. b.
20. Prosser, supra note 18, at 389.
21. The Restatement (Second) of Torts also specifically provides a wiretapping
example: "A, a private detective seeking evidence for use in a lawsuit ... taps B's
telephone wires and installs a recording device to make a record of B's conversations. A
has invaded B's privacy." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b, illus. 2, 3
(1977); see Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 229 (1931) (holding that tapping a tele
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Wiretap Law Before 1968

The Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 22 In Boyd v. United States, the Supreme
Court suggested that Fourth Amendment protections might extend
beyond the physical invasion of property in the conduct of searches
to cover the broader notion of "the privacies of life. "23 When first
directly confronted with this question in Olmstead v. United
States,24 however, the Court backed away from such a notion and
held that without a physical trespass into a private area, no viola
tion of the Fourth Amendment could OCCUr. 25
In Olmstead, the Court's earliest wiretap case, the issue was
whether law enforcement's warrantless wiretapping of the defend
ants' telephone lines was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 26
The Supreme Court held that there was no violation because the
wiretapping had not involved any physical trespass into the defend
ants' homes or offices. 27 The Court refused to enlarge the Fourth
Amendment's language "beyond the possible practical meaning of
houses, persons, papers, and effects, or so to apply the words search
and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight. "28 Instead, the Court ad
hered to a literal interpretation, holding that the search could only
be of "material things-the person, the house, his papers or his
effects. "29
But the Court spoke with a divided voice, splitting 5-4, with
Justice Brandeis delivering a vigorous dissent in defense of privacy
rights, almost forty years after his landmark Harvard Law Review
article on the sUbject. 30 In fact, Olmstead is now more often
remembered for Justice Brandeis's dissent than for the majority's
holding. 31 To Justice Brandeis, the invasion of "informational pri
phone line is an invasion of privacy akin to eavesdropping that can serve as the basis for
an action for damages); see also Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 111-12 (1964)
(holding that invasion of privacy is an actionable tort, and that installation of a listening
device in a bedroom was such an invasion, even if nothing was overheard).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
24. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
25. Id. at 465-66.
26. Id. at 455.
27. Id. at 465-66.
28. Id. at 465.
29. Id. at 464.
30. Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note
10, at 193.
31. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent, 52 .
RUTGERS L. REV. 781 (2000) (examining the evolution of dissenting Supreme Court
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vacy" was far more alarming than searches and seizures in the phys
ical realm. "As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and
general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppres
sion when compared with wire-tapping."32
Congress was more receptive than the Court to the proposition
that the American people should be protected from the insidious
invasiveness of wiretaps. In 1934, Congress enacted the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 (FCA).33 Section 605 of this Act pro
vided explicit protection against electronic surveillance of private
conversations: "[N]o person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the exis
tence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such inter
cepted communication to any person ...."34 In Nardone v. United
States,35 the Supreme Court held that the statute prohibited on stat
utory grounds what the Court had not prohibited on constitutional
grounds in Olmstead: the government could not use evidence ob
tained from illegal wiretaps in federal courts. 36
Section 605 and Nardone provided only limited protection,
however. .First, the Department of Justice interpreted Nardone as
prohibiting the interception and divulgence of private wire commu
nications, but not interception alone, so long as the contents of the
messages were not divulged to anyone outside the federal govern
ment. 37 Second, the FBI secured presidential authority to conduct
extensive wiretapping for national and domestic security pur
poses. 38 Third, for fifteen years, the Supreme Court held that the
opinions that become more famous than majority opinions). The Supreme Court has
cited the Olmstead dissent since 1945-more than twenty years before the decision was
overruled. [d. at 798. In fact, the Court cited the Olmstead dissent eleven times before
overruling the case in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and over 40 times since
then. [d. at 798 n.91.
32. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
33. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, tit. VI, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103-04
(1934) (current version at 47 U.S.c. § 605(a) (2000)). While the original § 605 prohib
ited both unauthorized interception and divulging or publishing the contents of the
communication, the current version omits prohibition of interception, leaving that act
to be covered by the Wiretap Act, and simply prohibits any person "receiving, assisting
in receiving, transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign commu
nication by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning thereof." 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (2000).
34. § 605, 48 Stat. at 1104.
35. 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
36. [d. at 382.
37. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 4, at 157.
38. With war on the horizon, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover convinced President
Roosevelt to authorize the use of wiretaps for intelligence purposes for the sake of
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federal law was not applicable to the states, and thus did not bar the
use of evidence obtained from illegal wiretaps in state courtS.39 Fi
nally, technology provided another means for avoiding the statu
tory prohibitions on wiretapping. While § 605 prohibited
interception of any wire or radio communication, it did not explic
itly prohibit other forms of electronic eavesdropping, such as sur
veillance using hidden microphones. 4o
The decade of the 1960s marked a dramatic turn-around in the
battle for protection from warrantless wiretapping. A series of Su
preme Court decisions gradually extended the reach of the Fourth
Amendment 41 while Congress prepared to implement a fundamen
tal change in the nature of federal wiretap law. 42
In 1967, the Supreme Court unequivocally established the right
to conversational privacy beyond the rigid bounds of a physical in
trusion. 43 In Berger v. New York,44 the defendant's conviction was
based on evidence obtained from an electronic eavesdropping de
vice that had been placed pursuant to a state-authorized warrant. 45
The Supreme Court held that the state's authorizing statute failed
to require sufficient particularity in the scope and duration of the
desired warrant to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's constitutional
national security. Id. at 157-58. After the war, the authority to wiretap for intelligence
purposes was renewed, and even broadened, to include purposes of "domestic security"
and "subversive activity." Id. at 158-61. The full extent of FBI wiretapping during this
period remains unclear, but is known to have extended to the surveillance of civil rights
leaders, members of the press, Supreme Court justices, senators, and congressmen. Id.
at 162-63.
39. Robert A. Pikowsky, The Need for Revisions to the Law of Wiretapping and
Interception of Email, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 1, 28 (2003) (citing
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952)). The Supreme Court eventually reversed
itself, but did so only two days before the enactment of the federal Wiretap Act in 1968,
which would change the entire landscape of wiretap law. Id. at 29 n.142 (citing Lee v.
Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 385 (1968)).
40. Nor, under Olmstead, were other forms of eavesdropping considered Fourth
Amendment violations absent a physical trespass. Thus, non-wiretap forms of elec
tronic surveillance, such as microphone surveillance, were regarded as perfectly legal
under § 605 and under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 29 (2003); see also Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129, 131-33, 135 (1942) (holding that the use of a microphone to
overhear the defendant's side of his telephone conversations did not constitute a viola
tion of the federal wiretap law, nor a Fourth Amendment violation, so long as no physi
cal trespass within the confines of a private area was made).
41. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
42. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
tit. III, 82 Stat. 197,211 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 2510-2522 (2000)).
43. See Berger, 388 U.S. 41; Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
44. Berger, 388 U.S. 41.
45. Id. at 44-45.
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standards. 46 The Court recognized that the use of electronic eaves
dropping devices was permissible, but only "under the most precise
and discriminate circumstances," and when "the 'commission of a
specific offense' was charged."47 The Fourth Amendment did not
render the home or office completely inviolable,48 but the New
York statute failed to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's particularity
standard. 49
Six months after Berger, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected
Olmstead's physical intrusion test in Katz v. United States. 50 In its
place, the Court enunciated the "expectation of privacy" concept. 51
In the Court's view, the physical intrusion test obscured the real
issue: "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."52
What a person "seeks to preserve as private" is protected under the
Fourth Amendment regardless of the presence or absence of any
physical intrusion. 53
Even so, electronic surveillance could be constitutionally au
thorized,54 but only in certain, narrowly-drawn circumstances. The
basis, purpose, and extent of the surveillance must be sufficiently
precise and constrained, so as to justify a "very limited search and
seizure" for legitimate law-enforcement purposes. 55 The safeguards
necessitated by such a covert intrusion into a citizen's privacy re
quired close judicial supervision. 56 Absent a judicial safeguard,
even an unquestionable showing of probable cause could not pre
vent a warrantless search from being held unlawful and "per se un
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. "57
Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, enunciated the new
standard of review for Fourth Amendment cases as whether the
46. Id. at 55-56, 63.
47. Id. at 63 (quoting Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966».
48. Id.
49. Id. at 60.
50. Katz v. United States, 389 u.S. 347, 352-53 (1967) (holding that warrantless
eavesdropping on conversations in a public telephone booth violated the Fourth
Amendment, even absent a physical intrusion).
51. Id. at 353.
52. Id. at 351.
53. Id. at 351-52.
54. Id. at 354 (citing Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1966».
55. Id. at 354-56.
56. Id. at 348.
57. Id. at 356-57. The government argued for the creation of a new exception to
the warrant requirement, for cases involving surveillance of a telephone booth. Id. at
358. The Court rejected this, explicitly holding "the procedure of antecedent justifica
tion" (a warrant) to be a constitutional requirement for the kind of electronic surveil
lance at issue. Id. at 359.
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person searched had a "reasonable expectation of privacy."58 This
standard has been routinely invoked since Katz as the general test
for Fourth Amendment violations. 59
C.

The Wiretap Act of 1968

Following the enactment of the FCA in 1934, wiretap surveil
lance was (ostensibly) prohibited under federal law. 60 Congres
sional investigations in the 1960s into organized crime, however,
revealed the need for the legal use of wiretaps by law enforcement
in order to combat that problem. 61 Congress finally legalized wire
tapping, to a limited extent, in 1968.62
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 con
tained a provision entitled "Title III-Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance," now commonly referred to as the "Wiretap Act,"
which legalized certain wiretapping when conducted with strong ju
dicialoversight. 63 The Wiretap Act completely revamped the prior
wiretap law (§ 605 of the FCA), at once permitting the use of wire
taps and other forms of electronic surveillance under federal law,
while also implementing considerable statutory limitations and pro
tections against the abuse of such surveillance. 64
Congress indicated in its findings a number of concerns that
had led it to enact the Wiretap Act. 65 First, Congress found that the
use of wiretaps and other devices to overhear wire and oral commu
nications without legal sanction was widespread. 66 Second, the use
of such surveillance was a critical aid to law enforcement in fighting
crime, especially, organized crime. 67 Third, it was necessary for
Congress to establish a uniform system for authorizing the intercep
tion of wire or oral communications to ensure that the privacy of
58. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
59. TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 8, at 97.
60. See supra notes 33, 34 and accompanying text. As noted, though, this law had
not actually prevented the frequent use of wiretaps, for various reasons.
61. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 4, at 169-70. But the idea of legislation that
would legalize wiretaps for law enforcement purposes was not universally embraced. Id.
at 170. Police, judges, and state attorneys general from around the nation opposed the
creation of federal wiretap laws, as did the Attorney General of the United States at
that time. Id. at 170-71.
62. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
tit. III, 82 Stat. 197,211 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 2510-2522 (2000)).
63. Tit. III, 82 Stat. at 211.
64. § 801(b)-(d), 82 Stat. at 211.
65. § 801, 82 Stat. at 211.
66. § 801(a), 82 Stat. at 211.
67. § 801(c), 82 Stat. at 211.
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such communications was effectively protected against unautho
rized intrusions. 68 Finally, as an additional measure of protection
against abuses that would put the privacy of innocent people at risk,
Congress prescribed close judicial oversight of authorized commu
nications surveillance, as well as limitations restricting such surveil
lance to the investigation of certain major and enumerated crimes. 69
The first line of defense against the abusive use of electronic
surveillance is the wiretap authorization process. A wiretap can
only be requested by certain designated state or federal prosecuting
attorneys'?o The request must be made to a judge, and must detail
the circumstances, the specific criminal offense being investigated,
the location to be bugged or tapped, the person whose communica
tions are to be monitored, the type of communication anticipated,
and the time frame for the proposed surveillance.71 In addition, the
applicant must convince the judge that other, normal investigative
methods have failed or are likely to fail to garner the evidence
sought,?2 If the judge is convinced that there is probable cause to
believe the contentions of the surveillance application, he or she
can issue an order authorizing the surveillance for a period of not
more than thirty days,?3 Renewal of a wiretap order for an addi
tional thirty days can be obtained by going through the entire pro
cess again. 74 These heightened requirements have led
commentators and some judges to refer to the court orders so is
sued as "super-warrants. "75

68. § 801(b), 82 Stat. at 211.
69. § 801(d), 82 Stat. at 211-12. It is important to note that the National Security
Agency's current, controversial program of warrantless foreign-intelligence wiretapping
is beyond the scope of this Note. The terrorism-related wiretaps, if subject to any fed
eral statute, would be subject to the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, not the domestic Wiretap Act. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-511, tit. I, §§ 101-111, 92 Stat. 1783-1796 (1978). There is, of course,
considerable controversy at present as to whether the NSA wiretaps are subject to stat
utory limitations, or if they are instead valid under the executive authority of the Presi
dent of the United States.
70. 18 U.S.c. § 2516 (2000).
71. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518 (2000).
72. 18 U.S.c. § 2518(3).
73. 18 U.S.c. § 2518(5). Warrantless national security electronic surveillance
continued until the Supreme Court declared such practices unconstitutional in 1972.
DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 4, at 176 (citing United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E.
Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972».
74. 18 U.S.c. § 2518(5).
75. See infra note 101.
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Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986

In the years following the enactment of the Wiretap Act, com
munications technology underwent dramatic changes. 76 The Wire
tap Act had been designed to regulate the communications
technology of 1968. By the 1980s, electronic communications (such
as e-mail) had become common, and the Wiretap Act simply did
not regulate them effectively, if at all. In 1986, Congress enacted
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA")77 to bring
electronic surveillance of digital communications within the scope
of federallaw.7 8
The ECPA was enacted to "update and clarify Federal privacy
protections and standards in light of dramatic changes in new com
puter and telecommunications technologies."79 Given the pace of
computer and telecommunications development, the Wiretap Act
was regarded by the ECPA's sponsors as "hopelessly out of date"
because of its failure to protect the integrity of data communica
tions, electronic mail, cellular and cordless telephone transmissions,
and other forms of electronic communication. 80
To address these modern concerns, the ECPA altered the ex
isting statute in three ways. Title I of the ECPA amended the ex
isting Wiretap Act (chapter 119 of title 18 of the U.S. Code) to
include electronic communications within its scope. 81 Title II of the
ECPA (called the Stored Communications Act, or SCA) added pro
tections for wire and electronic communications retained in com
puter storage facilities, because such information did not enjoy
either constitutional or statutory protections at the time. 82 Title III
of the ECPA addressed the use of pen registers and trap and trace
devices. 83 This Note is concerned primarily with the reach of Title
76. TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 8, at 230.
77. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711, 3121-3127
(2000».
78. TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 8, at 230; S. REp. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986),
as reprinted in 1986 u.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555.
79. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555.
80. Id. at 2.
81. Id. at 3.
82. Id.
83. Id. Title III of the ECPA is not relevant to this Note. Pen registers do not
record the content of wire or electronic communications, but provide the user with
collateral information, such as the number dialed, or the number from which a call
originates. Id.at 46. See generally Robert Ditzion, Note, Electronic Surveillance in the
Internet Age: The Strange Case of Pen Registers, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1321, 1325-35
(2004) (discussing pen-register technologies and applicable legal standards).
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I, the Wiretap Act (as amended), and to a limited extent Title II,
the SCA.84
Title I amended the Wiretap Act in various ways. The two as
pects most relevant to this Note are the changes to the definition of
"wire communication" under the Act and the addition of the term
"electronic communications" to the Act. First, prior to enactment
of the ECPA, the definition of "wire communication" in the Wire
tap Act read: "any communication made ... by the aid of wire,
cable, or other like connection."85 The ECPA modified this to:
"any aural transfer made ... by the aid of wire, cable, or other like
connection."86 This change from "communication" to "aural trans
fer" reflects Congress's intent that wire communications should be
limited to communications "which include the human voice at any
point between and including the points of origin and reception."87
The ECPA also added to the definition of "wire communica
tion" a critical provision, reading, "and such term includes any elec
tronic storage of such communication."88 The purpose of this
language was to indicate that "wire communications in storage like
voice mail, remain wire communications," protected by the Wiretap
Act. 89 In essence, a "wire communication" was meant to include
any communication that could be perceived as a human voice at
some point in the process, while "electronic communications" (dis
cussed immediately below) were meant to include all other forms of
communication employing electronic transmission technologies. 90
The second relevant change that the ECPA made to the prior
Wiretap Act was to include electronic communications within the
scope of its protections. 91 The ECPA defines "electronic communi
cation" as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds,
data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by
a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo optical sys
84. This Note will refer to both the pre-ECPA Wiretap Act and Title I of the
ECPA as the Wiretap Act. For clarity, the pre-ECPA version will be specifically identi
fied as such when the two versions contain relevant differences. Title II of the ECPA
will be referred to as the Stored Communications Act or the SCA.
85. 18 U.S.c. § 2510(1) (1970).
86. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. I,
§ 101(a), 100 Stat. 1848, 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. § 2510(1)
(2000».
87. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 11.
88. § 101(a), 100 Stat. at 1848.
89. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 12.
90. Id.
91. See § 101(c), 100 Stat. at 1851.
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tern" exclusive of certain categories, and in particular, excluding
any wire or oral communication. 92 The ECPA also expanded vari
ous provisions of the Wiretap Act that had applied only to wire or
oral communications to now apply to electronic communications, as
wel1. 93 The essential purpose of adding electronic communications
to the Wiretap Act was to update the protections offered by the law
in light of technological changes in communications. 94 In particu
lar, Congress wanted to protect the privacy of electronic communi
cations in a way similar to that in which wire communications had
been protected by the Wiretap Act since 1968. 95
Title II of the ECPA, the SCA, added a new chapter to title 18
of the U.S. Code. 96 The SCA makes it unlawful to gain unautho
rized access "to a wire or electronic communication while it is in
electronic storage" at a facility providing electronic communica
tions services.97 The statute provides for both criminal penalties
and civil damages under a private cause of action. 98 While the
Wiretap Act is the portion of the ECPA that is of primary impor
tance to interpreting the meaning of "intercept," it will be shown
that the interplay of the SCA with the Wiretap Act is also
significant.

II.

THE MEANING OF "INTERCEPT"

The question of when the acquisition of an electronic commu
nication constitutes an "intercept" in violation of the Wiretap Act is
one that has posed a considerable challenge for the courts. The
Wiretap Act is infamous for its lack of clarity,99 and any reading of
the provisions relevant to the meaning of "intercept" introduces in
consistencies. loo It is not a trivial point of law: if a given acquisition
falls within the bounds of the Wiretap Act, a very restrictive judicial
application process must be followed to obtain a court order au
92. § 101(a)(6)(C), 100 Stat. at 1849 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. § 2510(12)
(2000».
93. § 101(c), 100 Stat. at 1851 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 2510(5),
2510(8), 251O(9)(b), 2510(11), and 2511-2519 (2000».
94. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1-2.
95. Id. at 5.
96. § 201, 100 Stat. at 1860 (adding chapter 121, codified as amended at 18 U.S.c.
§§ 2701-2711 (2000».
97. 18 U.S.c. § 2701(a).
98. 18 U.S.c. §§ 2701(b), 2707.
99. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines (Konop I), 236 F.3d 1035,1042 (9th Cir. 2001).
100. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines (Konop II), 302 F.3d 868, 887 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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thorizing surveillance. 101 If an acquisition is not an "intercept"
under the Wiretap Act, the less rigorous requirements of a court
order or ordinary search warrant under the SeA are all that stand
between law enforcement and access to the communications.1 02
Thus, how the courts choose to interpret the statutory term "inter
101. See 18 U.S.c. §§ 2516, 2518. The provisions of § 2518 set a high threshold
for the issuing of a court order authorizing interception of wire, oral, or electronic com
munications. An application for such an order must articulate the particular criminal
offense suspected, the location of the place where the interception is to take place, the
particular type of communications to be intercepted, and the identity of the person
suspected of the offense and whose communications are therefore to be intercepted. 18
U.S.c. § 2518(1)(b). The application must also state in detail the other investigative
methods employed, and why such methods have been unsuccessful or will be unlikely to
succeed. 18 U.S.c. § 2518(1)(c). For the judge to issue an ex parte court order, he or
she must be convinced that there is probable cause to believe that the specified offense
has been, is being, or will be committed, and that communications concerning the of
fense will be obtained through the interception, if authorized. 18 U.S.c. § 2518(3)(a),
(b). The judge must also find that normal investigative procedures have been tried and
have failed, or would be unlikely to succeed if tried. 18 U.S.c. § 2518(3)(c). Further,
each court order must specify all of the information required in the government's appli
cation for the order. 18 U.S.c. § 2518(4). Some have taken to referring to these high
threshold court orders for wiretap surveillance as "super warrants." See In re Applica
tion of the U.S. for an Order, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 304-05 (ED.N.Y. 2005) (noting a
hierarchy of legal processes for obtaining court approval of electronic surveillance, plac
ing wiretaps under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 at the top of the hierarchy and designating
them as "super-warrant," and noting that a wiretap order "requires additional showings
not necessary to obtain a more traditional warrant"); see also Orin S. Kerr, Internet
Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw. U.
L. REV. 607,630-31 (2003) (noting Congress's enactment of a "super-warrant" require
ment for telephone and Internet surveillance by government agents).
102. Brief on Rehearing En Banc for Senator Patrick J. Leahy as Amicus Curiae
Supporting the United States and Urging Reversal, United States v. Councilman, 418
F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1383), 2004 WL 2707307. In contrast to the court order
required of the Wiretap Act, the SCA has a much lower threshold barrier to authorized
government access to stored wire and electronic communications: for communications
in electronic storage for 180 days or less, the government must obtain an ordinary
search warrant, "issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or equivalent
State" procedures. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2000). For communications that have been in
storage for more than 180 days, the government, depending on whether notice is given,
must obtain either an ordinary search warrant, an ordinary administrative subpoena, or
a court order. 18 U.S.c. § 2703(b) The court order under this SCA provision carries a
substantially lower burden for the government than the one under the Wiretap Act,
though. Under the SCA, a court order may be obtained merely "if the governmental
entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the ... [stored] information sought [is] relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation." 18 U.S.c. § 2703(d) (emphasis added). Thus, the SCA does not
require anywhere near the level of particularity or judicial oversight as the Wiretap Act
does to obtain disclosure of the communications in question. Indeed, when the FBI
executes wiretaps under a valid wiretap order for the interception of e-mail, it usually
has the service provider conduct the acquisitions, using methods very similar to those at
issue in Councilman. Brief for the Appellant at 38, United States v. Councilman, 418
F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1383), 2003 WL 24014616. The storage test would per
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cept" can have significant consequences for the level of privacy
people can enjoy in their electronic communications.
Several courts have looked back to the pre-ECPA interpreta
tion of "intercept" and have attempted to graft that standard onto
electronic communications. How these interpretations have played
out and evolved over time is explored below by examining the key
decisions on the question of precisely what constitutes an "inter
cept" under the Wiretap Act.
A.

The "Contemporaneous" Standard: United States v. Turk

The primary pre-ECPA precedent that courts have turned to is
United States v. Turk.lo3 In Turk, the defendant was convicted of
perjury, in part on the basis of a recorded telephone conversation (a
wire communication) to which he was a party, and which contra
dicted his sworn testimony.104 The recording had been made sur
reptitiously by the other party to the conversation (who was not
acting on behalf of law enforcement).105 While the making of the
recording itself was deemed an interception under the Wiretap
Act's definition,lo6 it did not constitute a violation of the Act "be
cause § 2S11(2)(d) specifically exempts situations in which one
party to the conversation is himself the interceptor."107 But the is
sue in Turk was whether law enforcement's subsequent and unau
thorized replaying of the recording constituted a separate
"intercept" under the Wiretap Act.
The Fifth Circuit held that no distinct interception occurs when
a previously recorded conversation is replayed. los The main legisla
mit the FBI to continue this method of acquisition, but without the necessity of a wire
tap order. Id.
103. 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1976).
104. Id. at 656-57.
105. Id. at 657.
106. The definition of "intercept" at that time differed from the current version,
but its effect on the factual circumstances in Turk would be the same under either ver
sion of the definition. At the time, the definition read "the aural acquisition of the
contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechani
cal, or other device." 18 U.S.c. § 2510(4) (1970). This differs from the current version's
text, which reads "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic,
or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."
18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2000). Under either version, the act of recording a private tele
phone conversation fits the meaning of "intercept" of a wire communication.
107. Turk, 526 F.2d at 657. The exemption reads: "It shall not be unlawful ... for
a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire ... communication where
such person is a party to the communication ...." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2000).
108. Turk, 526 F.2d at 659.
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tive intent underlying the Wiretap Act was to protect "[individual]
privacy against unjustified intrusions."lo9 As such, it was "the act of
[unauthorized] surveillance and not the literal 'aural acquisition' ...
[that] was at the center of congressional concern."110 Thus, the
court determined that no separate interception of a recorded com
munication occurred when the recording was later replayed. Ill
In its analysis of the meaning of "intercept," the court sug
gested what has become known as the contemporaneity standard:
interception requires "the contemporaneous acquisition of the com
munication through the use of [a] device."112 Later courts would
repeatedly refer to Turk as establishing, under the pre-ECPA wire
tap law, a standard requiring that interception occur contemporane
ously with the transmission of a wire communication,1l3 and many
would apply a modified version of contemporaneity as the test for
determining when an electronic communication has been inter
cepted in violation of the post-ECPA Wiretap Act.1 14
B.

The Storage/Transit Dichotomy: Steve Jackson Games v. U.S.
Secret Service

The seminal post-ECPA decision in which "intercept" was con
strued in the context of electronic communications is Steve Jackson
Games, Inc. v. u.s. Secret Service.1 15 In Steve Jackson, the govern
ment seized a computer pursuant to an ordinary search warrant, but
did not obtain a wiretap order before reading 162 unread, private e
mail messages stored on the computer's hard drive. 1l6 The Secret
Service read and deleted these e-mail messages. 117 The Fifth Cir
cuit considered whether reading the e-mails constituted an "inter
cept" in violation of the Wiretap Act,118 and concluded that it did
not.1 19 The court found that the e-mails were in "electronic stor
age" when retrieved by the Secret Service, and that "Congress did
109. Id. at 658.
110. Id. at 659.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 658.
113. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 460 (5th
Cir. 1994) (quoting Turk, 526 F.2d at 658); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Konop II),
302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002).
114. See infra Part I1.B.
115. 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
116. Id. at 459.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 460.
119. Id. at 458.
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not intend for 'intercept' to apply to 'electronic communications'
when those communications are in 'electronic storage."'120 This is
the now infamous "storage/transit dichotomy."
The court began its analysis by examining the text of the stat
ute. The Wiretap Act defines "intercept" as "'the aural or other
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communi
cation through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other de
vice.' "121 To determine whether an "acquisition" of an electronic
communication had occurred, the court needed to examine the defi
nition of "electronic communication" and decide whether the e
mails in question had been "electronic communications" within the
meaning of the Wiretap Act at the time they were acquired from
the hard drive.
In amending the previous version of the Wiretap Act to in
clude protections for electronic communications, Congress made
certain changes that the Steve Jackson court found key. First, the
definition of "wire communication" had been revised from "any au
ral transfer made ... by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connec
tion" to explicitly stating that the "term [wire communication}
includes any electronic storage of such communication."122 In con
trast, the definition for "electronic communication" that was added
by the ECPA defined that term only as "any transfer of signs, sig
nals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system ... but does not include ...
any wire or oral communication. "123 To the court, the most notable
feature of these changes to the Wiretap Act was that, unlike the
definition for "wire communication," the definition of "electronic
communication" did not contain any provision that explicitly in
cluded such communications while in electronic storage. 124
120. Id. at 461-62.
121. Id. at 460 (quoting 18 U.S.c. § 2510(4) (1986)).
122. Id. at 461 (quoting 18 u.s.c. § 2510(1)) (emphasis in original). The inclu
sion of communications in electronic storage in the definition of "wire communication"
was struck from the statute by the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001. Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 209(1), 115 Stat. 272, 283 (2001). For purposes of this Note, it is assumed that the pre
2001 version is the one under discussion, unless specifically otherwise noted. While the
definition of "wire communication" may have some bearing by analogy on the meaning
and scope of "electronic communication" under the statute, ultimately it is not disposi
tive on the question of how to identify interception of electronic communications under
the Wiretap Act.
123. Steve Jackson, 36 F.3d at 461.
124. Id.
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Both "wire communication" and "electronic communication"
are described as "transfers,"125 but only the former explicitly in
cludes "electronic storage" of such communications. The revision
to the definition of "wire communication" meant that in addition to
prohibiting any acquisition during transfer, the statute also prohib
its acquiring wire communications from electronic storage. But
"unlike the definition of 'wire communication,' the definition of
'electronic communication' does not include electronic storage of
such communications. "126 Since the e-mails at issue had been "in
electronic storage" (on the hard drive) at the time they were ac
quired for reading by the Secret Service, the court held that by the
plain language of the statute no interception in violation of wiretap
law had occurred. 127 With this, the Steve Jackson court established
the basic storage/transit dichotomy that many other courts would
follow in determining when the acquisition of an electronic commu
nication constitutes an "intercept" in violation of the Wiretap
Act.128
III.

UNITED STATES V. COUNCILMAN

(2005)

By early 2005, the majority of circuits to have examined the
issue had adopted the Fifth Circuit's storage/transit test when inter
preting the term "intercept" under the Wiretap Act. 129 In eleven
years, no other circuit had openly challenged the narrowing of
Turk's contemporaneity standard to a mechanistic determination of
whether the communication was "in storage" at the time it was ac
125. The definition for "wire communication" reads, "any aural transfer made by
[wire]," and that for "electronic communication" reads, "any transfer of [information)."
18 u.s.c. §§ 2510(1), 2510(12) (2000) (emphasis added).
126. Steve Jackson, 36 F.3d at 461 (emphasis in original).
127. Id. at 461-62.
128. See Hall v. Earthlink Network, Inc., 396 F.3d 500, 504 (2d Cir. 2005) (sug
gesting in dicta its acceptance of the Steve Jackson storage/transit standard, though not
required to apply such a standard because the facts of the case required decision based
on a service-provider exception); Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1077-78 (9th
Cir. 2003) (reaffirming Konop II and the storage test practically without comment);
United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1048-49 (11th Cir. 2003) (adopting the Steve
Jackson storage/transit standard where a private party gained access to files stored on
defendant's hard drive and forwarded them to police); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting the unanimous adoption of the storage test
in every circuit to have construed "intercept," and adopting the test itself); Konop v.
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Konop II), 302 F.3d 868, 876, 878 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Steve
Jackson and framing the issue in terms of Turk's contemporaneous-with-communica
tion standard and holding that "contemporaneous" meant, at least, "not while [the com
munication] is in electronic storage").
129. See supra note 128.
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quired.13° This finally changed in the First Circuit case of United
Sates v. Councilman. 131
In Councilman, an e-mail service provider duplicated the in
coming e-mail of its clients and read the duplicates without authori
zation.132 The defendant, Bradford Councilman, was the vice
president of an Internet company (Interloc, Inc.) that operated an
online rare-book listing service. 133 Part of its service was to provide
private e-mail accounts for its customers, who were book dealers. 134
In an effort to gain a commercial advantage,135 Councilman had the
company's e-mail delivery software modified so that all messages
sent to its customers from Amazon.com would be copied to a sepa
rate mailbox before delivery to the intended recipient. 136 The cop
ies were made without permission, before the intended recipients
had a chance to read their messages, and while the incoming e-mail
messages were in some form of temporary electronic storage. 137
Councilman and other company employees read thousands of these
copied e-mail messages.138 The First Circuit, sitting en banc, held
that such acquisitions of e-mail could constitute interceptions in vi
olation of the Wiretap Act, and that the district court's dismissal
had therefore been in error.139
The court addressed two basic issues with respect to the Wire
130. However, one of the First Circuit's own prior decisions had expressed some
skepticism about this approach. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir. 2003)
(invoking the general contemporaneity standard to find "interception" of electronic
communications where unauthorized acquisitions had occurred "simultaneously" with
the communications, but disapproving in dicta the "less than apt" storage/transit test in
light of technological developments since ECPA had been enacted).
131. 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005). The U.S. District Court in Massachusetts had
held that retrieval from storage of any kind was, by the language of the statute, not an
interception. United States v. Councilman, 245 F.Supp. 2d 319, 321 (D. Mass. 2003).
The First Circuit's initial review resulted in a panel decision affirming the district court's
holding. United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 204 (1st Cir. 2004). Later that year,
the panel decision was vacated, and a rehearing en banc was granted. United States v.
Councilman, 385 F.3d 793 (2004) (per curiam). The en banc opinion, rejecting the stor
age/transit test, was delivered in August 2005, and is the primary focus of this Note's
analysis. Councilman, 418 F.3d at 67.
132. Councilman, 418 F.3d at 70.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. The hoped-for advantages were the development of a list of books that its
clients were interested in, and learning about its competitors. Id. at 71.
136. Id. at 70.
137. Id. at 70-71. The parties stipulated that at all relevant times, the e-mails had
been in the company computer's random access memory (RAM) or on its hard disks, or
both. Id. at 71.
138. Id. at 70.
139. Id. at 85.
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tap Act: the meaning of "electronic communication" and the mean
ing of "intercept."14o Its principal analysis focused on the former
issue, finding that the latter was subsumed within the former be
cause Councilman's only argument against interception was that the
messages were not electronic communications at the time of
acquisition. 141
As to the meaning of "electronic communication," the prose
cution argued that the meaning was clear from the text of the defi
nition in the statute, and that the definition covered the e-mail
messages at issue. 142 Councilman argued, along the same lines as
the view underlying the Steve Jackson storage/transit dichotomy,
that any communication that is even momentarily in electronic stor
age is technically not an "electronic communication" under the
Wiretap ACt. 143 The court held that Councilman's reading of the
statute was inconsistent with congressional intent, and therefore
incorrect. 144
The court found that the plain text of the Wiretap Act was un
clear as to whether a communication in electronic storage, while in
the process of being transmitted, fell within the protective scope of
the ACt. 145 Taken alone, the court found that the statutory defini
tion of "electronic communication" was probably broad enough to
cover incoming e-mail messages while they were being processed by
the mail system's software. 146 But whether that definition could be
read alone or had to be considered in parallel with the statutory
definition of "wire communication," which specifically includes
messages in storage, was an ambiguous matter subject to conflicting
interpretations based on dueling canons of construction. 147
The defendant relied on the canon that Congress's inclusion of
particular language in one section of a statute and omission of simi
lar language in a parallel section should be read as a deliberate in
clusion and exclusion, respectively, of the matter contained in that
language. 148 As noted, the definition for "wire communication" ex
plicitly includes such communications while in electronic storage,
but the definition for "electronic communication" lacks such ex
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 72, 79.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 72-73.
See id. at 75 (noting that the two canons were "in tension").
Id. at 73.
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plicit language regarding electronic storage. The defendant read
that fact as a deliberate exclusion of communications in storage,
even transient storage, from the meaning of "electronic communi
cation," and therefore from the protections of the Wiretap Act.1 49
In tension with that canon was another: when Congress explic
itly enumerates exceptions to a general prohibition, additional ex
ceptions should not be implied in the absence of clear legislative
intent. 150 Since the Wiretap Act lists four specific exceptions to the
general definition of "electronic communication,"151 the additional
exception of all such communications in any form of electronic stor
age should not be implied. 152 Thus, at least some communications
in electronic storage might still be protected "electronic communi
cations" within the meaning of the Wiretap Act. The court con
cluded that the text was unclear and that applying the conflicting
canons of construction did not resolve the ambiguity.153
Turning to the legislative history, the court found that the re
cord indicated that the term "electronic communication" was meant
to include instances of transient electronic storage that are inciden
tal to the communication process. 154 As such, the argued distinc
tion between "in transit" and "in storage" communications was
rejected. 155 In the court's view, the e-mails at issue, while in tempo
rary electronic storage prior to delivery to the recipient's mailbox,
were still "electronic communications" within the statute's
meaning. 156
First, the court noted that the original bill's progress toward a
final version clearly indicated that the addition of "electronic com
munications" to the Wiretap Act was meant to provide broad pro
tections for such communications, and that lesser protections for e
mail had been suggested by the Department of Justice, and rejected
by Congress. 157 Further, the court noted that the definition of
149. Id.
150. Id. at 75.
151. Id. at 73 n.9 (quoting the exceptions given at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) as "(A)
any wire or oral communication; (B) any communication made through a tone-only
paging device; (C) any communication from a tracking device ... or (D) electronic
funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a communications system
used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds").
152. Id. at 75.
153. Id. at 76.
154. Id. at 79.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 76-77 (citing H. REP. No. 99-647 (1986) in support of a reading provid
ing broad protections for electronic communications such as e-mail).
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"electronic storage" was simply intended to provide protection, via
the SCA, for residual copies "left behind after transmission,"
messages stored in the e-mail user's mailbox, copies retained by ser
vice providers for billing purposes or as back-ups for its customers,
and the like. 158 The court found no evidence to suggest that Con
gress meant the statute's phrase "incidental to transmission" to ex
clude the type of storage necessary for the actual transmission
process itself from the protective scope of the Wiretap ACt. 159
Finally, the court found no evidence in the congressional re
cord that the addition of the "any electronic storage of such com
munication" language to the definition of "wire communication"
was intended to have any substantive effect on the scope of protec
tions afforded electronic communications. 16o The addition of that
language first appeared in the Senate markup version, after the
House passed the bill without such language, and no Senate co
sponsor ever suggested that such language was meant to remove
electronic communications from the protections of the statute while
briefly in electronic storage along the transmission route. 161 Thus,
the court found that the legislative history indicated that the "stor
age" language in the definition of "wire communication" was sim
ply meant to explicitly protect voice mail messages in storage, and
that no substantive impact on the meaning of "electronic communi
cation" was either intended or inferable. 162 The court concluded
that the meaning of "electronic communication" included any tran
sient storage that was "intrinsic to the communications process,"
and expressly rejected the storage/transit distinction. 163
Next, the court's analysis turned to the meaning of "intercept"
under the Wiretap Act. The court rejected Councilman's argument
that any communication acquired from electronic storage was by
definition not contemporaneous with transmission, and therefore
did not constitute an "interception" in violation of the Wiretap
158. Id. at 77 (citing the House Hearings and a report by the Office of Technol
ogy Assessment). It is important to note that the definitions in § 2510 serve double
duty as definitions for terms used in both the Wiretap Act and the SCA. Section 2711
of the SCA, entitled "Definitions for chapter," states that "[a]s used in this chapter ...
the terms defined in section 2510 [of the Wiretap Act] have, respectively, the definitions
given such terms in that section." 18 U.S.c. § 2711(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
159. Councilman, 418 F.3d at 77-78.
160. Id. at 78.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 78-79.
163. Id. at 79.
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Act. 164 The court regarded this argument as essentially the same as,
and "entirely subsumed within," the initial argument over whether
the definition of "electronic communication" included communica
tions in temporary storage. 165 Since the court had rejected Council
man's argument on that question, the argument over "interception"
was rendered moot. 166
Thus, the Councilman court rejected the Steve Jackson storage/
transit test. Instead, the court found that in some circumstances,
when electronic storage of a communication is "transient" and "in
trinsic" to the communication process, the communication is re
garded as an electronic communication within the protections of
the Wiretap Act, and thus necessarily still subject to the possibility
of interception in violation of the Act. 167
IV.

ANALYSIS

One fact emerges quite clearly from the various courts' discus
sions of how best to interpret "intercept": no single interpretation is
sufficient by itself. In particular, each interpretation fails to resolve
the conflict within the statute. 168 The statute should be interpreted
in a manner that is most consistent with the legislative intent, even
if some conflicts or inconsistencies remain. 169
The standard of contemporaneity provides the best indicator of
when an "interception" within the meaning of the statute occurs,
but this standard has largely been misapplied in cases involving
electronic communications. Once the proper understanding of
"contemporaneous" is established, a fairly straightforward frame
work emerges for analyzing future cases. In the analysis that fol
lows, this Note establishes that the storage/transit test for
interception is flawed and must be rejected, that contemporaneity
164. Id. at 79-80.
165. Id. at 80.
166. Id. at 79 (noting that Councilman had not provided any alternative argument
for finding that the acquisitions were not "interceptions").
167. Id.
168. See Dorothy Higdon Murphy, Note, United States v. Councilman and the
Scope o/the Wiretap Act: Do Old Laws Cover New Technologies?, 6 N.C. J. L. & TECH.
437,441 (2005) (asserting that a close reading of the ECPA allows reasonable people to
disagree as to the ECPA's meaning).
169. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Konop 1/), 302 F.3d 868, 887 (9th Cir.
2002) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("[T]he [relevant] question [is]: which reading is more
coherent and more consistent with Congressional intent?"); Murphy, supra note 168, at
441-42 (explaining that Congress introduced the ECPA to reflect the broad purpose of
the Wiretap Act).

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

426

[Vol. 28:403

interpreted broadly is the appropriate standard, and that a frame
work for future analysis emerges from this broader standard.
A.

The Storage/Transit Test Must Be Rejected
1.

Contrary to Congressional Intent, Interception is
Virtually Impossible

The technological nature of e-mail and other forms of elec
tronic communication renders the actual interception of such a
communication virtually impossible under the storage/transit test.
This fact would cause much of the amended Wiretap Act to be ef
fectively inoperative with respect to electronic communications. A
reading that would render a significant portion of the statute incon
sequential is, of course, to be avoided. 170 Thus, the storage/transit
test must be rejected in favor of an alternative that does not render
the statute's prohibition meaningless.
E-maip71 messages are not transmitted from sender to receiver
in the same manner as telephone communications. E-mail
messages are first broken down into short segments called packets,
which are sent from one computer in the network through a series
of other computers, until they reach the destination computer.l72
The packets are then reassembled to recreate the original mes
sage. 173 Software on the destination computer then directs the mes
sage from temporary storage into the more permanent storage that
constitutes the intended recipient's "mailbox."174 In addition, the
message may be temporarily reassembled from the packets at some
intermediate point between sender and receiver, stored tempora
rily, and "re-packetized for [another] leg of [its] journey."175 While
en route, the message may not be immediately deliverable, and
could therefore be stored for later deliveryP6 Once delivered, the
170. See Konop II, 302 F.3d at 888; see also Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S.
389,394 (1940) ("A literal reading of [a statute] which would lead to absurd results is to
be avoided ....").
171. As previously mentioned, "e-mail" is used throughout this Note as a proxy
for all forms of electronic communications. See supra note 1. Thus, if an interpretation
fails to protect e-mail as Congress reasonably intended, then the interpretation should
be rejected.
172. See generally Kerr, supra note 101, at 613-16 (describing the technical details
of "packet-switched" communications networks).
173. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 2005).
174. Id. at 70.
175. Id. (citing J. Klensin, RFC 2821: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (Apr. 2001)
and Jonathan B. Postel, RFC 821: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (Aug. 1982)).
176. Id.
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intended recipient retrieves the message from his or her mailbox
and can then read, save, or delete the message. 177
Unlike a phone call, the entire e-mail message is delivered vir
tually instantaneously, spending an "infinitesimal amount[] of time
[actually] 'en route."'178 Thus, for someone other than the in
tended recipient to acquire the contents of such a communication,
the usual method is to duplicate one of the copies of the message
that are held in temporary electronic storage, either at some point
en route, or at the destination computer. 179
If no interception occurs when an electronic communication is
acquired from storage, as the Steve Jackson test asserts, then "inter
ception of E-mail within the prohibition of the ECPA [would be]
virtually impossible. "180 This virtual impossibility would render the
177. Id.
178. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Konop II), 302 F.3d 868, 888 (9th Cir.
2002) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Nicole Giallonardo, Note, Steve Jackson Games v.
United States Secret Service: The Government's Unauthorized Seizure of Private E
Mail Warrants More Than the Fifth Circuit's Slap on the Wrist, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COM
PUTER & INFO. L. 179, 198 (1995) (citing Sebastian J. Leonardi, Roadmap to the In
ternet, BARRISTER, Spring 1995, at 18).
179. Konop II, 302 F.3d at 888.
180. Id. (quoting Jarrod J. White, E-mail@Work.com: Employer Monitoring of
Employee E-Mail, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1079,1083 (1997)); see also United States v. Steiger,
318 F.3d 1039, 1050 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that under the storage test very few acquisi
tions of electronic communications would be "interceptions" under the statute, and that
in fact such interception would be "virtually impossible"); Kristi Belt, Note, Did Con
gress Really Intend to Give Investigative Officers Free Reign With Your Personal Elec
tronic Mail?-Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457
(5th Cir. 1994),41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1457, 1472 (2000) (charging that the Steve Jackson
analysis "fail[s] to take into consideration" the very nature of an e-mail message); Jar
rod J. White, E-Mail@Work.com: Employer Monitoring of Employee E-Mail, 48 ALA.
L. REV. 1079, 1083 (1997) (asserting that under the Steve Jackson approach there is but
"a narrow window during which an E-mail interception may occur ... , [and] unless
some type of automatic routing software is used ... , interception of E-mail within the
prohibition of the ECPA is virtually impossible"); Giallonardo, supra note 178, at 198
(stating that under the Steve Jackson approach the Wiretap Act would "not protect e
mail at all" because of the nature of the technology); Susan Freiwald, Online Surveil
lance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REv. 9, 55, 83 (2004)
(noting that under the storage/transit test, law enforcement can easily circumvent the
super-warrant requirements of the Wiretap Act by simply waiting "perhaps a nano
second" until the e-mail has reached its final destination, and that under this interpreta
tion the number of investigations that will have to confront wiretap restrictions is re
duced to "almost zero"). Regardless of whether interception would be nearly
impossible, it would certainly be very unlikely since any hacker intent on acquiring
messages could easily avoid prosecution for violating the Wiretap Act by simply making
the acquisitions "from the dozens, or even hundreds, of places an electronic communi
cation resides, usually for 'mere nanoseconds,' [on] the Internet." Stephen V. Treglia,
Transitory E-Storage: First Circuit Creates New Legal Concept in 'Councilman,' N.Y.
L.J., Sept. 20, 2005, at 5, 7.
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entire set of changes by the ECPA to the prior Wiretap Act largely
ineffective, contrary to Congress's intent in enacting the changes.
When Congress enacted the Wiretap Act in 1968, and again
when it amended it in 1986, it made clear that the underlying pur
pose of the law was to protect the expectation of privacy in private
communications.1 81 The ECPA's revisions were meant to update
the Wiretap Act and expand its protections beyond wire and oral
communications, to include privacy protections for electronic com
munications. 182 In particular, Congress was concerned with ensur
ing the privacy of communications in accordance with the principles
embodied in the Fourth Amendment. 183 The storage test clearly
defeats this fundamental purpose by making interception of elec
tronic communications "virtually impossible. "184 Therefore, the
181.

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,

§ 801(b), 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968); S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555; see also Belt, supra note 180, at 1472, 1474 (noting that e-mail
is transmitted to a recipient with the same expectation of privacy as attends telephone
calls and ordinary postal-service mail, and asserting that privacy interests "remain con
stant regardless of the form of the communication"). Arguably, the same reasoning
applies regardless of whether an e-mail is "on the wire" or in temporary storage, when
that e-mail has not yet been delivered to the intended recipient: the expectation of
privacy should be unaffected by these temporary technological distinctions.
182. S. REp. No. 99-541, at 3; see also Belt, supra note 180, at 1470; Giallonardo,
supra note 178, at 198-203 (discussing Congress's intent of protecting the privacy of
electronic communications and ensuring the public's confidence in using such forms of
communication). Belt identifies Congress's desire to update the Wiretap Act in light of
technological and structural changes in the telecommunications industry. Belt, supra
note 180, at 1470; see also S. REp. No. 99-541, at 5 (stating that "the law must advance
with the technology to ensure the continued vitality of the Fourth Amendment").
Omitting wiretap protections while e-mail messages are momentarily in storage at vari
ous points along the transmission path would in fact ignore the technological and struc
tural developments that make e-mail possible in the first instance. That would clearly
be contrary to Congress's stated intent.
183. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5. At least one court has explicitly held that the
Fourth Amendment'S reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone conversations (ar
ticulated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 247 (1967» extends, by analogy, to protect
the privacy of e-mail communications. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417
(C.A.A.F. 1996). The congressional intention to protect privacy is not limited to pri
vacy for its own sake; it has also been asserted that Congress intended to protect a
governmental interest in such privacy-that of encouraging the exchange of ideas and
information. Murphy, supra note 168, at 441; see also Guirguis, supra note 2, at 154
(arguing that now that Olmstead's physical intrusion test "no longer controls Fourth
Amendment inquiry, it makes no sense to extend constitutional protection to a locked
container ... in transit, and then withhold protections from [encrypted e-mails traveling
the Internet]").
184. See supra note 180 and accompanying text; Brief for the Center for Democ
racy and Technology et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant's Petition for Rehear
ing and Rehearing En Banc, United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005)
(No. 03-1383), 2004 WL 2058257 (characterizing the storage test as causing the Wiretap
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storage test must be rejected.1 85
2.

The StorageiTransit Test Arises From a Misreading of the
Statute

In addition to its failure to advance Congress's general purpose
in enacting the ECPA, the storage/transit test is the product of an
improper reading of the specific statutory language. Language in
two sections of the ECPA makes clear that Congress anticipated
that at least some acquisitions from electronic storage could consti
tute "interception" of electronic communications.1 86 Furthermore,
the legislative history shows that the addition of language pertain
ing to storage to the definition of "wire communication" was not
intended to have any implicit impact on the definition of "electronic
communication. "
First, two provisions of the ECPA indicate that Congress con
sidered interception by acquiring electronic communications from
electronic storage entirely possible. 187 The first section was added
as an amendment to the Wiretap Act's definition of "electronic
communication" in 1996. In § 2510(12)(D), Congress added the
following to the short list of exclusions, things not considered elec
tronic communications despite the broad language of the definition:
"electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institu
tion in a communications system used for the electronic storage and
transfer of funds."188 If, as Steve Jackson held, electronic communi
cations in storage could never be "intercepted" under the Wiretap
Act, then why would the definition of "electronic communication"
need a specific exclusion for stored financial information? The fact
Act to be "unhinged" from the Supreme Court's precedent on the Fourth Amendment
requirements for electronic surveillance, because it would permit law enforcement to
easily circumvent the Wiretap Act and "reduce [it] to almost a nUllity").
185. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 76 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[D]espite the exis
tence of literal language that might dictate a contrary result, a court should interpret a
statute in such a way as to effectuate clear legislative intent. ").
186. 18 U.S.c. §§ 2510(D), 2701 (2000).
187. See infra text accompanying notes 188-194; see also 18 U.S.c. §§ 2510(D),
2701 (2000). Various other sections of the Stored Communications Act also refer to
electronic communications that are in electronic storage, demonstrating that the Steve
Jackson reading of the definition of "electronic communication" as excluding any such
communication in storage is without merit. See, e.g., 18 U.S.c. § 2701(a) (referring to
an "electronic communication while it is in electronic storage") and § 2703(a) (2000)
(entitled "CONTENTS OF ELECfRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN ELEC
TRONIC STORAGE").
188. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 731(1), 18 U.S.c.
§ 251O(12)(D) (2000) (emphasis added).
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that this amendment explicitly excludes certain "stored" informa
tion from the definition shows that Congress clearly felt that the
existing definition did include at least some such communications
while in storage.
The other section of the statute that makes a similar assump
tion is § 2701 of the SCA.189 There, the text states that "whoever
... obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or elec
tronic communication while it is in electronic storage ... shall be
punished as provided [elsewhere]."19o Subsection (c) then states
that the provision just quoted "does not apply with respect to con
duct authorized ... in section ... 2518 of this title."191 Section 2518
is the provision of the Wiretap Act describing the process by which
an application for court-authorized "interception of a wire, oral, or
electronic communication" may be made. 192 Thus, the SCA pro
vides penalties for unauthorized access of stored electronic commu
nications, unless that access has been authorized under the
interception provisions of the Wiretap Act.1 93 This can only mean
that the interception of an electronic communication while it is in
electronic storage is possible-a possibility that required making an
explicit exception in the text of the SCA. If no communication in
storage could be intercepted, there would be no need for the
exception. 194
The second indication that the storage test is the product of
statutory misreading comes from the legislative history. The
ECPA's addition of "includ[ing] any electronic storage of such com
munication"195 to the definition of "wire communication" was not
189. See 18 v.s.c. § 2701; Giallonardo, supra note 178, at 183-84.
190. 18 V.S.c. § 2701(a) (emphasis added).
191. 18 V.S.c. § 2701(c).
192. 18 V.S.c. § 2518 (2000).
193. Giallonardo, supra note 178, at 197. Giallonardo believes that this exception
"indicates that, if the proper warrant is obtained, the government may legally intercept
an electronic communication in electronic storage. Therefore, ... [at least some] stored
electronic communications are subject to interception under the Federal Wiretap Act."
Id. Giallonardo would go so far as to apply the exception to e-mail that had been
delivered but not yet read by the intended recipient. Id. at 197-98. Whether the protec
tions of the Wiretap Act should extend that far (and this Note does not address that
issue), the exception stated in § 2701 still indicates that at least some electronic commu
nications in storage can be intercepted.
194. See Murphy, supra note 168, at 457 (arguing that language throughout the
ECPA, similar to that in § 2701, "would make little to no sense" if communications in
storage were not included in the coverage).
195. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. I,
§ 101(a)(6)(C), 100 Stat. 1848,1849 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 V.S.C. § 2510(1)
(2000)).
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meant to draw a distinction with "electronic communication," but
rather was simply intended to clarify or emphasize the fact that the
meaning of "wire communication" was meant to cover stored ver
sions of such communications, such as voice mail. 196
Because wire communications can take place entirely absent
any electronic storage, Congress wanted to indicate clearly that the
wiretap law was also meant to cover the storage of such communi
cations, such as in a voice mail system. 197 In contrast, the technol
ogy underlying electronic communications makes it impossible for
such transfers to occur without the use of electronic storage at vari
ous points along the transmission path. Thus, no explicit inclusion
of electronic storage was needed in the definition of "electronic
communication," since reading the text as excluding such intrinsic
and inevitable storage would render the wiretap law's protection of
electronic communications virtually meaningless. 198
3.

The Storageffransit Test is the Product of a Faulty
Analytic Process

In addition to its problems satisfying legislative intent and the
text of the statute itself, the storage test under Steve Jackson was
the product of faulty legal reasoning. The court in Steve Jackson
inappropriately relied on a "plain language" approach to interpret
ing the statute that does not hold up under close examination. 199
There are two basic problems with this approach.
First, even the "plain" reading of the statute's text requires
some degree of additional reasoning, beyond simply taking the
words (or their absence) at face value. The plain reading argument
relies on a canon of construction (that inclusion of language in one
provision and omission of that language in another provision is de
196. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 78-79 (1st Cir. 2005); S. REP. No.
99-541, at 12 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3566 (describing the pur
pose of the revision as "to specify that wire communications in storage like voice mail,
remain wire communications, and are protected accordingly").
197. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Konop I), 236 F.3d 1035, 1045 (9th Cir.
2001).
198. See id. Indeed, Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the original sponsor for the Senate
version of the ECPA, has stated that the storage test is inconsistent with the legislative
history and "would essentially render ECPA's extension of [the Wiretap Act] to elec
tronic communications a dead letter." Brief on Rehearing En Banc for Senator Patrick
J. Leahy as Amicus Curiae Supporting the United States and Urging Reversal, United
States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1383), 2004 WL 2707307.
199. Belt, supra note 180, at 1458-59; see Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret
Service, 36 F.3d 457, 461-62 (5th Cir. 1994).
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liberate and meaningfu1)20o and an inference that the omission of
"storage from the definition of 'electronic communication'" was
meant to indicate complete exclusion of stored electronic communi
cations, including when that storage is a part of the transmission
process. 201 Reliance on the canon to support the implicit inference
demonstrates that the plain language, by itself, "is not so plain."202
Indeed, this reliance is not terribly surprising. As the Supreme
Court has noted, "linguistic analysis [alone] seldom is adequate
when a statute is designed to incorporate fundamental values."203
In addition, the definitions for "wire communication" and
"electronic communication" are not sufficiently parallel to warrant
application of the canon in the first place. 204 The essential basis for
Steve Jackson's storage test was the notion that the language of the
two definitions should be compared and contrasted in order to infer
what Congress intended the statute to cover. 205 But this approach
is flawed, because the two definitions are both structurally and tem
porally dissimilar. 206 The definition of "wire communication" was
written, in most of its essentials, for the 1968 version of the Wiretap
Act. 207 The clause "and such term includes any electronic storage
of such communication" was tacked on to the existing definition
when the ECPA was enacted in 1986, but the definition was not
otherwise changed, except in minor or irrelevant ways.208
In contrast, the definition for "electronic communication" was
drafted from scratch almost twenty years after the original Wiretap
200. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 73 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Russello
v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589-90 (1968) (holding that opening
an unlocked door violated a statutory prohibition on "breaking open" the door, despite
the lack of the use of force, based on constitutional values underlying the statute). In
deed, the values at issue in the statute in Sabbath were the very same Fourth Amend
ment protections that underlie the Wiretap Act, passed in the same year that Sabbath
was decided. Id.; see supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
204. Councilman, 418 F.3d at 74-75.
205. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 461 (5th
Cir. 1994).
206. Councilman, 418 F.3d at 75.
207. Id. "The revised definition [of wire communication] hews closely to its origi
nal definition in the 1968 Wiretap Act." Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 213 (1968).
208. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. I,
§ 101(a)(1)(D), 100 Stat. 1848,1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. § 2510(1)
(2000)); see also Councilman, 418 F.3d at 78 (noting that the clause was added to the
definition of "wire communication" during Senate markup).
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Act, is defined in broad terms, and (unlike "wire communication")
contains a listing of four specific exclusions. 209 The definition of
"electronic communication" does not include any specific reference
to electronic storage, except in one of the narrow, specific, exclu
sions. 210 Thus, both in terms of when the definitions were written
and in terms of their structure, the definitions of "wire communica
tion" and "electronic communication" are not sufficiently parallel
to warrant a plain text comparison. 211 Read by itself, without com
parison to "wire communication," the plain text of the definition of
"electronic communication" is ambiguous as to whether at least
some messages in temporary storage could be intercepted within
the statute's meaning. 212 Therefore, the plain language of the stat
ute is not determinative.

B.

"Intercept" Should Be Determined Using a Broad
Contemporaneity Standard

Having demonstrated the analytic, structural, and substantive
flaws of the Steve Jackson storage test, the question remains: how
should "intercept" of electronic communications be determined?
Although the court in Councilman made the right call in rejecting
the Steve Jackson storage test, the First Circuit failed to provide any
interpretive guidance of its own. This Note argues that the basic
contemporaneous-with-transmission standard, unfettered by the
storage straightjacket, is the appropriate standard of analysis.2 13 In
enacting the ECPA, Congress recognized and attempted to protect
the expectation of privacy in electronic communications. 214 The
contemporaneous-with-transmission interpretation, properly de
209. See Councilman, 418 F.3d at 75, 77. The court also pointed out that the
listing of the four exclusions brought a separate canon of construction into play:
"Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, ad
ditional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legis
lative intent." Id. at 75 (quoting TRW v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19,28 (2001)) (emphasis
added). The fact that this canon existed in tension with the inclusion/exclusion canon
meant that "[a]pplying [the] canons of construction does not resolve the question." Id.
at 76.
210. 18 U.S.c. § 2510(12) (2000); see Councilman, 418 F.3d at 73.
211. Councilman, 418 F.3d at 75.
212. Id. at 76.
213. See Giallonardo, supra note 178, at 206 (stating that the Steve Jackson court
should have applied the basic Turk view of interception, requiring an acquisition simul
taneous with the act of communication).
214. See S. REp. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3559.
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fined, ensures that those expectations of privacy are effectively
protected.
The essential kernel of interception, identified in Turk, is that
the surveillance activity-the acquisition-occurs at the time of the
communication and thereby causes the communication's contents
to become known to the unauthorized person conducting the sur
veillance. 215 Fundamentally, this is precisely the kind of activity
that the Wiretap Act as amended by the ECPA is intended to pro
scribe: acquisition of communications at the time the communica
tion takes place, regardless of whether it is an oral, wire, or
electronic communication.
"Contemporaneous" is not a term of art.2 16 It does not appear
in the statute,217 and its first use by the Fifth Circuit in Turk was
simply a straight-forward, plain-English description of the privacy
interest meant to be protected by the Wiretap Act.2 18 The language
of that court, which expressed concern over "activity engaged in at
the time of the ... communication,"219 has been echoed by several
of the courts analyzing contemporaneity since then. They have de
scribed the standard as involving a determination of "real-time in
terception,"22o an "acquisition during 'flight,' "221 a simultaneous
acquisition,222 or a "real-time requirement."223 The various de
scriptions-real-time, during flight, simultaneous, or at the time of
communication-all carry the same basic connotation, that acquir
ing the contents of a communication while the act or process of
communication is occurring must be regarded as a violation of the
Wiretap Act.
Not all messages acquired from electronic storage will satisfy
this standard. Messages acquired from long-term, post-delivery
storage will usually be acquired "a substantial amount of time af
ter" the transmission process has occurred, and thus will not consti
215. See United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1976). The exact lan
guage of Turk, in the context of a tape-recorded conversation, was: "activity engaged in
at the time of the oral communication which causes such communication to be over
heard by uninvited listeners." Id. (emphasis added).
216. See id. at 659 (noting that "acquisition" in the statute, which the court
equated with "contemporaneous," was "used by the Congress neither as a term of art
nor as a term of technology").
217. Id. at 658.
218. See id.
219. Id. (emphasis added).
220. United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003).
221. Id.
222. In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir. 2003).
223. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 80 (1st Cir. 2005).
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tute "contemporaneous" acquisitions that violate the Wiretap
Act. 224 On the other hand, at least some acquisitions from storage
will be able to satisfy this real-time version of contemporaneity.
Electronic communications will often be both in storage and in
transit at the same time. 225 When such communications are "ac
quired while ... still en route to the intended recipients,"226 it is
practically a truism that such acquisitions are made "at the time of
the communication," in real-time, and even "during flight,"227-in
other words, contemporaneously.
The narrowing of Turk's broad contemporaneity standard to a
mechanistic storage inquiry228 was unnecessary. The courts em
ploying the storage test have found no violation of the Wiretap Act
in factual circumstances that would have failed the broader contem
poraneity test as well. The facts of Steve Jackson (e-mail on a hard
drive, after delivery but before being read by the intended recipi
ent), Konop II (unauthorized viewing of a website well after it had
been posted), Steiger (acquisition of files stored on a hard drive),
and Fraser (employee's e-mail stored on a company hard drive read
by the employer) all involved acquisitions of communications that
were not in any way "contemporaneous" with the act of communi
cating. 229 As the First Circuit noted in In re Pharmatrak, the other
circuits had invoked the contemporaneity standard to exclude ac
quisitions made "a substantial amount of time after material was put
into electronic storage."230 In reality, the courts did not need the
224. See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 21 (citing Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1048-50;
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Konop II), 302 F.3d 868, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2002); and
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 458 (5th Cir. 1994)).
225. United States v. Councilman, 245 F.Supp.2d 319, 321 (D. Mass. 2003), affd
by United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 203 (1st Cir. 2004), vacated, reh'g granted
en bane, 385 F.3d 793 (1st Cir. 2004) (per curiam), rev'd, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005).
226. Councilman, 418 F.3d at 80.
227. This description may require viewing "flight" in its broad sense, as being
somewhere in the process of going from A (sender) to B (recipient).
228. See Giallonardo, supra note 178, at 198 (describing the storage test as a "nar
row interpretation" of interception under the Wiretap Act). But cf Pikowsky, supra
note 39, at 53 (comparing the Steve Jackson rejection of Wiretap Act protections for
electronic communications in storage to the "discredited rationale of Olmstead, which
denied Fourth Amendment protection against wiretaps conducted without a physical
trespass").
229. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 459 (5th
Cir. 1994); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Konop II), 302 F.3d 868, 872-73 (9th Cir.
2002); United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1043-44 (11th Cir. 2003); Fraser v. Na
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 110 (3d Cir. 2003).
230. In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing United States v.
Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1048-50 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added); Konop II, 302 F.3d at
872-73; and Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 458 (5th Cir.
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storage/transit dichotomy to find that no "contemporaneous" ac
quisition had occurred in those cases. 231 In fact, applying the "real
time" understanding of contemporaneous, as described above,
would change the rationale but not the outcome of those cases.
Thus, rejecting the unnecessary storage test in favor of the more
logical real-time conceptualization of the contemporaneity standard
would bring the application of the Wiretap Act to electronic com
munications in line with the intent of Congress without seriously
undermining the existing case law.

C.

A Framework for Determining Interception

With the federal circuits now technically in conflict over the
proper interpretation of the "intercept" of electronic communica
tions, a framework for analysis is needed to reconcile the opposing
views. This Note proposes the use of the contemporaneous-with
communication standard in its broad sense, as first articulated in
United States v. Turk, and as discussed immediately above. 232 In
addition, to aid in the application of this standard, a triad of factors
bearing on the question of contemporaneity is suggested.
The first factor to consider is whether the acquisition of an
electronic communication occurred when that communication was
in electronic storage. Such an acquisition is usually not contempo
raneous with the transmission process. 233 Thus, this factor weighs
against contemporaneity, and against finding an "intercept" in vio
lation of the Wiretap Act. This is virtually the same test as is cur
rently used by the courts that observe the Steve Jackson storage/
transit test. The difference is that when characterized as merely
one factor in the determination, it is no longer conclusive. The facts
of Councilman provide the most obvious example of when an ac
quisition would be considered contemporaneous, despite an acqui
sition from electronic storage.
1994)) (emphasis added); see also Murphy, supra note 168, at 454-55 (noting that the
issue in Councilman, pre-delivery acquisition, had not been faced by prior courts that
had relied on the storage test).
231. Brief for the Appellant at 29-30, United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67
(1st Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1383), 2003 WL 24014616 (noting that none of the cases in the
other circuits had involved "acquisition of communications during transmission," and
that therefore any language suggesting a storage test was merely dicta) (emphasis
added).
232. See supra Part IV.B.
233. See Karen Ertel, E-Mail Intercept Violates Wiretap Law, First Circuit Holds,
TRIAL, Nov. 1 2005, at 83, 85 (describing the facts of Councilman as presenting a unique
case).
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The second factor is whether the electronic communication
was acquired prior to reaching its final destination. Given the virtu
ally instantaneous nature of the electronic communications process,
when a communication is acquired prior to delivery to its intended
recipient, the acquisition is likely to be contemporaneous with the
act of communication. Thus, this second factor weighs in favor of
an "intercept" in violation of the Wiretap Act. 234 Of course, this
factor is not dispositive, either. It is unlikely, for example, that
Congress intended for communications that are stored as "dead let
ters," when undeliverable to their intended recipient, to remain in
definitely protected by the Wiretap ACt. 235
A third important factor to consider is whether the acquisition
occurred virtually simultaneously with the communication process.
If so, this factor would weigh heavily in favor of finding an "inter
cept" in violation of the Wiretap Act. When the surveillance
method acquires the contents of a private communication virtually
at the same instant in which the act of communication is occurring,
it should not matter whether the contents were acquired from stor
age nor whether they were acquired a second or two after delivery
to the intended recipient. The function of the ECPA in protecting
the privacy of such communications should dictate that such acqui
sitions are forbidden.
The most important aspect of this series of factors is that none
of them is dispositive. They can be used to simplify the initial eval
uation of a given acquisition of an electronic communication, but
ultimately the courts must exercise reasonable judgment, taking
into account the facts and circumstances of each case, in determin
ing whether the acquisition constitutes a contemporaneous acquisi
tion in violation of the Wiretap Act. The factors are an aid to that
determination, but the standard to be used in deciding whether an
"intercept" under the statute has occurred is the real-time, contem
poraneous-with-communication standard.
234. See Murphy, supra note 168, at 455 (describing the acquisition of an elec
tronic communication before delivery to the intended recipient's mailbox as a "crucial"
distinction).
235. See United States v. Councilman, 245 F.Supp.2d 319, 321 (D. Mass. 2003),
affd by United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 203 (1st Cir. 2004), vacated, reh'g
granted en bane, 385 F.3d 793 (1st Cir. 2004) (per curiam), rev'd, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir.
2005) (noting that if retrieval of messages from storage was not uniformly deemed to
fail the "intercept" requirement, courts would be required to sort which forms of stor
age are covered by the statute and which, such as back-up copies and undeliverable
messages, are not).
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CONCLUSION

The First Circuit's decision in United States v. Councilman is in
conflict with the strict rule established by other circuits that any
acquisition of an electronic communication from any form of stor
age cannot, by definition, be a violation of the Wiretap Act. This is
a consequence of the shortcomings of the so-called storage/transit
dichotomy as a rule for interpreting the scope of "interception"
under the statute. Over the past decade, various circuits have
adopted the storage test, but have applied it to factual circum
stances that would not even have satisfied the contemporaneity
standard, absent the storage test. 236 Thus, the storage-based nar
rowing of traditional contemporaneity was unnecessary, and in ret
rospect inappropriate. Contrary to the legislative intent underlying
the ECPA, the storage test renders violation of the Wiretap Act,
with respect to electronic communications, virtually impossible. 237
Therefore, the Steve Jackson storage/transit test for interception
must be rejected, and a new framework for analysis erected in its
place.
The contemporaneous-with-transmission standard remains the
most appropriate measure of interception under the Wiretap Act.
But the term "contemporaneous" is a broad one, not easily reduced
to a reliable and consistent, mechanistic test. Courts should evalu
ate the contemporaneity of an alleged interception on a case-by
case basis, considering all the facts and circumstances of each case.
Whether an electronic communication is retrieved from electronic
storage, whether the communication has yet been delivered to its
intended recipient, and whether the acquisition occurs simultaneous
with the transmission process itself are all factors to be considered.
They can give courts initial guidance on the question of intercep
tion, but the ultimate determination of whether a given acquisition
occurred contemporaneous with transmission must rest with the
judgment of the courts.
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